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4Coalitional game and Party Coalition Potential. 
A Reappraisal of a Forgotten Concept
Abstract The purpose of this research note is a critical revision of Sartori’s index 
of coalition potential.  Sartori devised the coalition potential, together 
with the blackmail potential, in order to discriminate among the par-
ties and to spot the relevant ones in any given party system. Although 
the blackmail potential was never operationalized, Sartori made the 
attempt with respect to the coalition potential and advanced a relative 
index. Nonetheless, Sartori’s index of coalition potential is not very use-
ful because, in his own admission, it is not a measure of the coalition 
relevance of the parties but rather a measure of the fragmentation of 
governmental coalitions. It is, in other words, an ex post measure with 
no predictive capability. The mainstream of the theory of coalition 
points out that in any coalition game the potential of each actor is di-
rectly proportional to its weight, that is the coalition potential of any 
actor increases directly as its weight increases. On the other hand, the 
coalition potential of any actor is inversely proportional to its relative 
political distance from other members of any winning coalition, that 
is the more distant the parties are from each other the more costly is 
their cooperation in any winning coalition. Anchoring on these two 
standards of the coalition theory, the paper puts forward a conceptual 
schema for the analysis and the measure of the coalition potential of 
parties in a predictive way. Such a measure should be based on their 
weights (measured as % of parliamentary seats) and relative distance 
(measured as position distance on a cardinal space). The schema helps 
the identification of four types of parties, with high or low coalition po-
tential, complementary parties, and blackmailing parties.
Keywords Coalition Potential, Spatial models, Party competition, 
Complementary party, Blackmailing party
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Gioco coalizionale e potenziale di coalizione partitico. Rivalutare un 
concetto dimenticato
Sintesi Lo scopo di questa nota di ricerca è una revisione critica dell’indice di 
Sartori del potenziale di coalizione. Sartori ha introdotto il potenziale 
di coalizione, insieme al potenziale di ricatto, al fine di discriminare tra 
i partiti e individuare quelli rilevanti in ogni dato sistema di partiti. 
Sebbene il potenziale di ricatto non sia mai stato operazionalizzato, 
Sartori ha tentato invece la costruzione di un indice del potenziale di 
coalizione. Tuttavia, l’indice del potenziale di coalizione di Sartori non 
è molto utile perché, per sua stessa ammissione, non si tratterebbe di 
una misura della rilevanza coalizionale dei partiti ma piuttosto di una 
misura della frammentazione delle coalizioni governative. In altre pa-
role, l’indice di Sartori è una misura ex post, senza capacità predittiva. Il 
mainstream della teoria della coalizione sottolinea che in ogni gioco di 
coalizione il potenziale di ciascun attore è direttamente proporzionale 
al suo peso, cioè il potenziale di coalizione di qualsiasi attore aumenta 
direttamente con l’aumentare del suo peso. D’altra parte, il potenziale 
di coalizione di qualsiasi attore è inversamente proporzionale alla sua 
relativa distanza politica rispetto ad altri potenziali membri di qual-
siasi coalizione vincente, cioè più i partiti sono lontani l’una dall’al-
tro più è costosa la loro cooperazione in qualsiasi coalizione vincente. 
Facendo perno su questi due standard della teoria della coalizione, il 
paper propone uno schema concettuale in chiave predittiva per l’anali-
si del potenziale di coalizione dei partiti basato sui loro pesi (misurati 
come % di seggi parlamentari) e sulla loro relativa distanza (misurata 
come distanza posizionale su uno spazio cardinale). Lo schema consen-
te l’identificazione di quattro tipi di partiti, con potenziale di coalizione 
alto o basso, partito complementare e partito ricattatorio.
Parole chiave Potenziale di coalizione, Modelli spaziali, Competizione 
partitica, Partito complementare, Partito ricattatorio
61. Introduction
The very first use of the notion of coalition potential dates back to Sartori (1970; 
1976: 122) who employed it as a conceptual equivalent of governing potential. 
Sartori was at that time tackling the problem of the typology of the party systems 
and he needed to establish some reliable and empirically grounded numerical 
criteria to discriminate among the multi-party systems in accordance with the 
number of existing parties. According to Sartori, a party should be counted as 
long as it qualifies for relevance in the party system relations and dynamic. Two 
criteria of relevance were identified, the coalition potential and the blackmail 
potential. With these conceptual tools at his disposal, the analyst would be 
able to discount as irrelevant any party that has neither coalition potential nor 
blackmail potential. 
The purpose of this research note is a critical revision of Sartori’s index of 
coalition potential, which is operationalized by Sartori himself (Sartori 1976: 
300-304), while a similar endeavor has never been attempted with regard to the 
blackmail potential. Sartori did specify that a party discloses blackmail potential 
«whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition 
and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition – by determining 
a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition either leftward, rightward, 
or in both directions – of the governing-oriented parties». Nonetheless, Sartori 
admits further on that «these rules may appear unduly complicated and, in any 
case, difficult to operationalize». Finally, he displaces the reader and admits «that 
both criteria are postdictive, for there is no point in using them predictively» 
(Sartori 1976: 123). Therefore, the coalition potential is not a measure of the 
coalition appeal of the parties but rather a measure of the fragmentation of 
governmental coalitions (Sartori 1976, 302). The coalition potential «means 
that the “feasible coalition”, and thereby the parties having a coalition potential, 
coincide, in practice, with the parties that have in fact entered, at some point in 
time, coalition governments and/or have given governments the support they 
needed for taking office or for staying in office» (Sartori 1976: 123).
These assumptions breed some confusion and some limitations. The 
confusion is mainly lexical, because Sartori chose to label potential what as a 
matter of definition is a measure of actual relevance. Indeed Sartori recognized 
that the coalition potential «demands two measures: one for the governing 
potential, and one for the actual governmental relevance» (ibidem: 300), but 
then he opted resolutely for the operationalization of the actual governmental 
relevance as a ratio between the number of time units (the legislatures, n) and the 
coalition units c «attributed to a party every time it takes part in a government or 
gives it decisive support (if only by abstaining)» (ibidem: 301-302):
n/Sc
i
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This index presents some limitations for the research (Ieraci 1992: 21-
22). Firstly, it lacks sufficient analyticity because it signals only the degree of 
governmental fragmentation at the systemic level. It is no use if one aims at 
measuring the variations of governmental relevance of the parties over time and 
individually. Secondly, it does not disclose the tactics of the opposition parties 
vis à vis the governmental parties and the significant changes over time in the 
coalitional game. It is, in other word, a static index, which does not say which 
parties are governmentally relevant; when they are relevant; and how relevant 
they are in comparison with each other. Paradoxically, the conceptual foundation 
of the blackmail potential seems more promising because Sartori made explicit 
reference to the tactical conditioning reciprocally exercised by the parties in a 
given party system as an indication of blackmail potential. However, as we said, 
Sartori omitted this.
What we are searching for is some kind of perspectival measure of the 
governing potential of each party, rather than of a systemic measure of the 
fragmentation of the governmental coalitions such as Sartori’s. The two indexes 
of governmental participation and governmental responsibility suggested in previous 
researches (Ieraci 1992: 32) are analytical, they refer to the actual governmental 
relevance of each party and in a diachronic perspective, but they are postdictive 
as well as Sartori’s coalition potential.  Nonetheless, if our scope is an evaluation 
of the sustainability of the future or potential coalitions on the base of a given 
distribution of weights (i.e. percentage of seats in the legislature) among the 
parties, we need a new approach to the problem.
We are in need of a new index of the coalition potential of the parties 
which should be: a) really capable of capturing the potentiality of the parties in 
relation to each other; b) therefore, predictive rather than postdictive; c) and 
finally, analytical rather than systemic, that is descriptive of the individual party 
potential impact on the coalitional game or, more generally stated, on the overall 
dynamics of the party system. Sartori was probably using the term «potential» in 
a mere allusive way and more as a synonym of «conditioning» than in its proper 
meaning. It is prima facie evident that the parties are capable of influencing 
the coalitions and the governmental game in various ways and with variable 
degrees of effectiveness, and that this capacity is shown by their participation 
in the government coalitions and by their ability to exercise drives on the party 
competition. Nonetheless, Sartori’s coalition potential – as I argued above – and 
its complementary blackmail potential do not capture in any meaningful way 
these aspects. On the other hand, if one looks at the conceptual meaning of the 
term «potential» in physics, as in «potential energy» for instance, one discovers 
that it encloses aspects which were to some extent captured by the two potentials 
of coalition and blackmail devised by Sartori although not in a conclusive and 
straightforward fashion. Any scientific definition of the term potential, and 
obviously in connection with the concept of «energy», will refer to the energy 
possessed or stored in a body or system and derived or due to its position relative 
8to others within a given field (electric, magnetic, or gravitational). This definition 
enlightens the relative and positional property of the energy potential, and 
its confinement to some delimited field or system. In the political sphere, the 
political potential of any party in the coalition game would be given by both the 
«energy», i.e. «parliamentary weight», possessed by it (which leads to what 
Sartori decided to label coalition potential), and its position in relation to the 
other parties, i.e. the «drives» exercised over the coalition game (which in turn 
leads to what Sartori labelled blackmail potential).
In the following sections, I will try to approach the concept of party coalition 
potential in a new fashion, taking into account its positional character and 
its effectiveness within the boundaries of a given party system. The main 
suggestions will be drawn from the coalition theory and the spatial approach to 
party systems (next section), which offer plentiful insights over the dynamic of 
coalition formation. The coalition theory of the «first generation» (Caplow 1956; 
Gamson 1961; Riker 1962) pointed at the «weight» of the party as one of the 
main factors influencing its capacity to enter in coalition. The weight of the party 
could be conceived as a functional equivalent of the «stored energy» of a body 
in physics. To the coalition theory of the «second generation» (Downs 1957; 
Axelrod 1970; De Swaan 1973) we owe another crucial conceptual tool, that is the 
concept of political space and the idea that the position of each party influences 
the others in the competing dynamic. 
 
2. Coalition theory and coalition potential in unidimensional spaces of 
competition
The mainstream of the theory of coalition points out that in any coalition game 
the potential of each actor is directly proportional to its weight. The bigger an 
actor is the more likely it is that it will be part of the winning coalition, because it 
would be costly for the other actors to exclude it without expecting its opposition 
in the institutional arenas and possibly without facing its capacity to mobilize 
some societal opposition. Therefore, the coalition potential of any actor should 
increase directly as its weight increases. In the institutional arenas, which 
mostly concern us here, such a ‘weight’ can be measured for instance in terms 
of parliamentary seats. On the other hand, the coalition potential of any actor 
is inversely proportional to its relative political distance from other potential 
members of any winning coalition. If the political distance between any two 
or more actors is assumed as an indication of the potential conflict of interest 
between them (Axelrod 1970), then the more distant they are from each other the 
more costly is their inclusion in any winning coalition. Let us scrutinize these 
two assumptions in turn and in depth.
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Assumption 1: The coalition potential of any party (or political actor) is directly 
proportional to its weight consistently adopted (i.e., percentage of seats in an assembly, 
votes, and similar). 
Caplow (1956; 1968) was probably among the first scholars to formalize this 
assumption in his studies on the coalitions in the triads. Caplow adopted a 
psychological approach and emphasized that the propensity of the actors to 
form coalitions depends on the perception of the mutual «threat» they exercise 
in any given situation. In a triad, the two weaker actors will try to coalesce to 
face the foreseeable threat of the strongest third actor and reduce his hegemonic 
claim. Caplow’s conclusion was that in a triad only coalitions between equal or 
potentially equal actors are likely because the actors rationally want to avoid being 
subjected to any hegemonic player (Caplow 1956, 490). Some time later, Gamson 
(1961; 1964) resumed Caplow’s intuition, combining it with the perspective of 
the game theory. In the perspective of the game theory, a utilitarian incentive to 
form coalitions is offered to the actors by the payoff of the gaming situation (i.e., 
control over political offices, acquisition of social or economic advantages, ability 
to exercise power or influence, and so on). Therefore, if the actors are rational, 
each of them will try to secure the largest portion of the payoff for himself. From 
these assumptions two consequences could be logically drawn. Firstly, each 
actor has an interest to be included in the winning coalition because this is the 
only way to secure for himself a share of the payoff. Secondly, each actor has an 
interest in excluding as many actors as possible from the winning coalition, 
because the less numerous the winning coalition is, the bigger will be the share 
of the payoff for each of the actor included.1 To some extent, combining Caplow’s 
and Gamson’s perspectives, it could be argued that in the coalition game the 
foreseeable threat arising from the alliance with a quasi-hegemonic actor is 
balanced by the prospect of a secure win and by the guarantee of enjoying a share 
of this victory. In other words, to be included in a winning coalition, no matter 
at which level of risk, makes the actors better off than being excluded from it.2 
These observations lead to limiting Caplow’s conclusion. While it is true that the 
smaller actors can fear the alliance with the larger ones, on the other hand, the 
latter are able to attract the smaller ones precisely because they can guarantee 
1 Since Riker (1962) we are accustomed to refer to this implication as the size principle: ratio-
nal actors would form only minimum winning coalitions, which are coalitions that would become 
losing by the defection of one and only one actor.
2 The implications of this argument with regard to the coalition theory were clearly pointed 
out by Butterworth (1971, 1974). Butterworth argued against Riker (1962) and Shepsle (1974) 
that if tradeoffs among the actors are possible, the incentive to be included in the winning coa-
lition would encourage some actors even to pay a compensation to the winning actors in order 
to be included. Indeed, in a zero-sum game the payoff of the winners equals the loss of the 
losers and if the latter were eventually included in the winning coalition they would benefit by 
reducing their share of the negative payoff. For a presentation of the Butterworth-Riker contro-
versy, see Ieraci (1994, 40-43).
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the inclusion in the winning coalition, its durability over time and a share of the 
coalition payoff.3
We can conclude this brief review by observing that in the formation of 
coalitions the weight of each actor counts and that, despite some psychological 
constraints, the larger actors are able to attract the smaller ones to them by 
awarding prizes, winning odds and by guaranteeing the durability of the 
coalition.
Assumption 2: In any unidimensional space of competition, the coalition potential of 
any party (or political actor) is inversely proportional to its distance to the metrical axis of 
the coalition that would result.
The perspective outlined above met with strong criticisms from the coalition 
theories of the so-called «second generation» (Axelrod 1970, De Swaan 1973). 
These theories emphasized that the self-interest of the actors would be balanced 
by the need to control the conflict within the winning coalition. Each coalition, 
in fact, pursues decisions or policies, as well as being a machine to procure 
offices, therefore the actors have to reduce the conflict and opposition that can 
be determined within the coalition when it comes to pursuing policies and 
making decisions, if they are concerned with the effectiveness of the decision-
making process. The coalition theories of the «second generation» focused on 
the policy pursuing character of the coalitions, rather than on their office seeking 
character. Since Downs (1957), the most effective way of representing political 
conflict over decisions has been through the use of political or competition 
spaces. Leaving aside for now the controversy of whether the political space is 
one-dimensional (represented as a line) or multidimensional (represented as a 
system of coordinates), the employment of a political space as a conceptual and 
methodologic tool allows to operationalize the political conflict as a measurable 
distance among the «ideal positions» occupied by each actors. Preliminary to 
this method of operationalization is the assumption that the more distant the 
actors are on the political space, the greater is their potential conflict or degree of 
disagreement over the policies to be pursed or the decisions to be made.
These preliminary observations lead to the conclusion that the minimum 
winning character of the coalitions is linked to the spatial extension of the 
coalition itself, namely to its ideological diameter. If the ideological dimension 
of party politics and the structure of the political cleavages are taken into 
consideration, it would seem unlikely that parties not belonging to the same 
3 Ieraci’s Governance Index (1992) showed that some minor parties obtained a payoff rate di-
sproportionally higher than their relative strength. This observation would reinforce the hypo-
thesis that in the perception of the smaller parties the potential hegemonic threat of the large 
parties is offset by their ability to guarantee a reward and perhaps even to offer to their allies a 
«bigger slice of the cake» than one would expect.
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ideological family would coalesce or that parties aligned on a given political 
continuum would cross over each other. Therefore the winning coalitions are 
normally minimal and ideologically connected (minimal connected winning 
coalitions, Axelrod 1970). De Swaan (1973) resumes Axelrod’s formulation and 
re-states the principle of ideological connectedness as the principle of policy 
distance minimization:
a. Each actor (i.e. political party) aims at being included in a winning coalition 
that pursues policies as close as possible to those it prefers.
b. Consistently with the theory of the median voter (Black 1958), if in a given 
policy space all the policies are aligned and connected,  an actor will be pivotal 
if its weight is not less than the absolute difference among the total weights 
of the actors to his left and right (De Swaan 1973, 93-94). Consequently, al-
though the notion of pivotal actor does not coincide with that of median voter 
devised by Black, its position on the policy space is such that it overlaps and 
includes that of the median voter.4
c. Each actor will seek to be included into the winning coalition and to occupy 
the pivotal position within it. In fact, this position is the one that minimizes 
the distances between his ideal policy position and those of the other players 
on his left and right included in the winning coalition.5
The assumptions 1 and 2 attempt to combine two aspects that can make a party 
coalition-relevant or not. These aspects are the political weight of the party in the 
parliamentary arena and its policy or ideological proximity to the other members 
of the coalition.6 This approach to the analysis of the party coalition potential is 
summarized by the conceptual schema sketched in Tab. 1, which identifies two 
other cases apart for the two polar situations (parties with either low or high 
coalition potential). 
4 This argument is developed by Ieraci (1994, 73-76).
5 For further developments of the debate, see Van Deemen (1989, 1991) e Van Roozendaal 
(1990) who substitute the notion of pivotal actor with that of dominant actor.
6 Remy (1975, 295-298) classified the pivotal parties according to their weight, their position 
in the parliamentary spectrum and their position in the coalition, identifying the complemen-
tary party (relatively small, does not occupy a central position in the parliamentary spectrum, 
can occupy various positions in the coalition spectrum), the buffer party (almost majoritarian, 
not necessarily central in the parliamentary spectrum, but essential for the formation of coali-
tions, central to the coalition spectrum), the balance party (almost majoritarian or dominant, 
central in the parliamentary spectrum but placed at one of the ends of the coalition spectrum, 
indispensable for the formation of a coalition), and the wing party (dominant but not central 
in the parliamentary spectrum, occupies the extremes of the coalition spectrum). Remy’s pro-
posal is full of interpretative insights, but remains qualitative and above all it seems that the 
criterion of the party’s position in the parliamentary spectrum is redundant with respect to its 
position in the coalition.
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Table 1 – A Conceptual Schema for a New Approach to the Analysis of the Party Coalition 
Potential
Party parliamentary weight
Low High
Party position 
with regard to 
the axis of the 
coalition
Near 
(strong drive)
Complementary party Party with 
HIGH COALITION 
POTENTIAL
Far 
(weak drive)
Party with 
LOW COALITION 
POTENTIAL
Blackmailing party
Figure 1 – A hypothetical multi-party system with two coalition relevant parties, one 
complementary party and two blackmailing parties (Multilateral distribution with no 
dominant party)
Weights of the parties as % of parliamentary seats: A = 25%; B = 24%; C = 7%; D = 31%; E = 13%.
If  B-C-D were the Winning Connected Coalition, then:
 A and E: Blackmailing parties.
 B and D: Coalition Relevant Parties.
 C: Complementary Party.
1  Drives of the competition.
a and b: «Coalitional Subsystems».
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The complementary party, as suggested by Remy (1975),7 is a small party 
positioned around the coalition axis, which is not decisive for the formation of 
winning coalitions but which can be systematically included in them by virtue 
of the ideological connectedness principle. The blackmailing party very closely 
resembles Sartori’s conceptualization of the blackmailing potential (Sartori 
1976, 123-124, 344), as above recalled in the Introduction section. An example 
can help to clarify the point, as shown in Figure 1.
In Fig. 1 a hypothetic multi-party system is sketched, in which the weights of 
the parties as % of parliamentary seats are distributed as such: A = 25%; B = 24%; C 
= 7%; D = 31%; E = 13%. The three connected coalitions allowed by this distribution 
of weights and positions are A-B-C, B-C-D, and C-D-E. If it is assumed that B-C-D 
results as the Winning Connected Coalition (62% of the parliamentary seats), 
B and D would be Coalition Relevant Parties. Indeed, they control a winning 
majority (55%) on their own. Nonetheless, the Complementary Party C would 
be included in this winning coalition to respect the principle of ideological 
connectedness. Finally, A and E would result as two Blackmailing Parties, excluded 
from the winning coalition but capable of conditioning (in Sartori’s terms) the 
«direction of the competition».
3. Coalitions in Multidimensional spaces of competition
The mainstream of the coalition theory has dealt with unidimensional spaces of 
competition, following the tradition inaugurated by Downs (1957) and pushed 
forward by Sartori’s analysis of the dynamic of competition in multi-party sys-
tems (Sartori 1976). The principle of ideological connectedness has been either 
implicitly or explicitly adopted by any interpretation of party competition in 
unidimensional spaces, and Assumption 2 above introduced and discussed ev-
idently bows to that tradition.
Nonetheless, the reliability of the unidimensional paradigm has been 
recurrently questioned, particularly since the turn of the XX Century when the 
economic and class-centred ideologies of the XIX Century and early XX Century 
(for instance, Capitalism, Liberalism, Communism, Socialism, and Fascism) 
have been fading away and the European party systems have been experiencing 
turbulent phases of realignment along new structures of cleavages. The difficulties 
are increased by the multiple use of the metaphor of the «space competition». It 
is indeed possible to spot at least three different uses of it. As a policy space, the 
space of competition can be treated as a position space and it can generate cardinal 
measures of the ideal policy points of the actors. On a policy space the actors may 
7 See note 6 above.
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incline towards negotiation over their relative positions and policy ideal points. 
As an ideological space, the space of competition becomes a valence space (Stokes 
1963) and the position of the actors are more rigid and unnegotiable. Finally, 
as party-defined space (Budge and Farlie 1977, 1978) it retains the rigidity of the 
ideological alignments, because party identification implies the establishment 
of some bonds between parties and voters which are based on relatively rigid 
factors such as socialization, political culture and socio-economic class. On one 
hand, flexible (over policies) and rigid (over ideology and/or identifications) 
dimensions might interfere, therefore making the interplay of the actors more 
difficult.8 On the other hand, even if a positional policy perspective is adopted, 
policies cannot be aligned on a single dimension and they tend to interfere with 
each other or to combine in variable ways (Ieraci 2006, 2008), particularly when 
the left-to-right simplifier ideological criterion is missing.
In a multi-dimensional space the principle of ideological connectedness 
is not effective anymore, because the parties may rally around single issues or 
sets of issues. The case might not be particularly relevant when the number of 
competing parties is limited to two (two-party systems, two-and-a-half-party-
systems), but it is when we are observing a «multilateral distribution» of parties 
either with a dominant party or without it.9 In such case, the political space 
might result polarized and it is hard to identify any clear ideological cleavages 
on it. Position issues are now predominant over valence issues (Stokes 1963). 
Although crossing over positions among parties is strictly forbidden by any 
spatial modelling of party competition, this does not seem to be necessarily the 
case in systems with multilateral distribution and no dominant party. This does 
not refer to crossing the floor by MPs, a practice historically widespread among 
the Italian political class for instance, but to the opportunity for the parties to 
cross over each other and to establish coalitional links with parties that are not 
adjacent to them. This would be another deviation of the traditional spatial 
analysis, which allows only «ideological connected coalitions» (Axelrod 1970). 
If there are no ideological cleavages and disjoints on the space, why should 
the parties not coalesce freely? The standard assumption that parties could not 
cross each other depended on the preliminary adoption of a unidimensional 
space of competition. Nonetheless, if the parties are not bound any more to the 
XIX century ideological continuum left-to-right and the space of competition 
becomes multidimensional, based on a plurality of position issues rather than 
on a single valence issue, there is no reason why it should not be possible for the 
parties to move freely on the space and to link with each other in terms of shared 
visions and perspectives over issues.
8 A similar criticism with regard with to Sartori’s polarized pluralism theory was set by D’Al-
imonte (1978).  
9 For the definition of multilateral distribution, see Ieraci 2012. 
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Finally, in any multilateral distribution with no dominant party or pole 
the drives of the competition are similarly multidirectional (shown by the 
pointed arrows in Fig. 1). This depends on the previously discussed properties 
(multidimensionality and absence of constraint to the movements of the parties), 
that is it depends on the propensity of the parties to find shortcuts through the 
space and to link with each other with regard to sets of issues. At the same time, 
although no party dominates the game, the relative weight of some of them (like 
the parties B and D in Fig. 1) might exercise attraction drives in the coalitional 
game over the smaller parties. The system would work as a set of subsystems 
(a and b in Fig. 1) where some complementary parties are orbiting round some 
coalition relevant parties, functioning as sort of anchor points of the system. 
Therefore, the overall picture would show a complex interplay of centripetal and 
centrifugal drives.
4. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to reappraise a very promising concept, that of «party 
coalition potential», which has been neglected through the years and never 
properly developed. It should be possible to put forward a combinatory index 
of the parties coalition potential based on their weights (i.e., measured as % of 
parliamentary seats) and relative distance (i.e., measured as position distance on 
a cardinal space). Such an index would allow us to classify and distinguish among 
parties with high\low coalition potential, on one hand, and complementary and 
blackmailing parties, on the other hand (see Tab. 1). Finally, the measure of the 
coalition potential we are searching for should be a relative measure of each 
party potential with regard to any given coalition composition and in different 
historical phases. Of the two conceptual dimensions of the coalition potential 
(party parliamentary weight and party relative distance), the former is easily 
available and reliable. The latter is more controversial. Indeed, the systematic 
surveys of the party distances are multiple, but there is no homogeneity of 
method in the surveys so that the results produced are sometimes incongruous. 
However, this should not be an impediment to proceeding in this direction if the 
researcher is animated by sufficient stubbornness and he is able to use the main 
available findings in a selective way. The analysis should be country based and 
subsequently developed on a comparative scale. Composition of the coalitions, 
coalition diameters (i.e., party distances) and parliamentary party weights are 
the three sets of data we are in need of. The study might prove fruitful in so far 
as it implements a relative measure of the coalition potential and it has some 
predictive power.
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